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Hedge fund vs. non-hedge fund institutional demand and the
book-to-market effect
Mustafa Onur Caglayana, Umut Celikerb,*, Gokhan Sonaerc

1. Introduction

The book-to-market effect, the average return difference between high book-to-market and low book-to-market ratio securities, has been one of the oldest and most widely investigated topics in the asset pricing literature. Although Fama and French (1992,
1993, 1995, 1996) provide risk-based justifications, a large part of
the following literature attributes this phenomenon to the naive
investors’ overreaction. Daniel et al. (1998), and Barberis et al.
(1998) show investors’ overconfidence, biased self-attribution and
the tendency of investors to view events as representative to be
the source of this overreaction. Similarly, La Porta et al. (1997) and
more recently Brav et al. (2005) find significant evidence of expectations error, supporting the view of overreaction as the basis for
the book-to-market premium.1
While naive investors’ overreaction could contribute to the
book-to-market effect, one can claim that sophisticated investors,

namely, institutions, should exploit this return predictability, take
advantage of the anomaly, and therefore mitigate the extent of
overreaction. However, contrary to expectations, recent studies
provide striking evidence that institutional investors actually ex
acerbate this price overreaction, thereby contributing to the bookto-market effect. In other words, institutions do not act in a sophisticated manner and do not take into account the information
that high book-to-market (value) stocks outperform low book-tomarket (growth) stocks. Jiang (2010) shows empirical evidence that
institutions tend to trade in the direction of intangible returns.2 In
other words, institutions buy shares in response to positive intangible information and sell shares in response to negative intangible
information, causing excessive pricing (overreaction) of such information, thereby contributing to the formation of book-to-anomaly,
which is driven by the subsequent correction of overreaction to
past high intangible returns. Jiang (2010) also reveals that the value
effect increases with the intensity of institutional trading, particularly due to the poor subsequent performance of growth stocks
that have been subject to intense uninformed institutional buying.

In a recent study, Edelen et al. (2016) provide similar evidence
that institutions not only fail to change their portfolios to take
advantage of the book-to-market effect, but they do the opposite and buy significantly more of the overvalued low book-tomarket (growth) stocks compared to undervalued high book-tomarket (value) stocks over time. More importantly, Edelen et al.
(2016) reveal a negative and significant relation between changes
in institutional holdings and future stock returns when both the
standard book-to-market anomaly portfolio formation period and
the anomaly return measurement period span a year or longer. It
is critical to emphasize that the underperformance of portfolios
based on institutional trading with respect to book-to-market is
driven primarily by the poor performance of growth stocks that
are heavily bought by institutions.
In this paper, we examine whether a prominent sub-group of
institutional investors, hedge funds, act differently than the other
institutional investors and adjust their positions to take advantage
of the book-to-market effect prior to the standard return measurement window of book-to-market portfolios. Our particular focus is
on hedge funds; because both trading wise and structurally they
differ from other institutional investors, such as mutual funds, pension funds, endowments, etc. in many ways. First, hedge funds
have a much shorter horizon with their investments than other
institutional investors. Compared to other institutional investors,
hedge funds can get in and out of positions much easier and faster.
This is evident in our data in the twice as high turnover statistics reported for hedge funds compared to other institutional investors. Second, hedge funds are not heavily regulated by government agencies and therefore they have much more flexibility in
their investment strategies (including the use of short-sell, leverage and derivatives) and they do not face any concentration issues as do other institutions. Thus, when an opportunity comes up,
hedge funds can either load on a particular stock heavily or short
the stock as much as short-selling constraints allow, and in turn
they can exhaust the mispricing to a great extent.3 In other words,
hedge funds are in a better position to detect mispriced securities
and trade them to their advantage compared to other institutional
investors.4
We measure hedge fund and non-hedge fund demand (with
respect to book-to-market effect) during the six-quarter window
prior to return measurement of anomaly returns by utilizing the
institutional demand measure of Edelen et al. (2016), which is
based on the change in the number of institutions holding a stock
in a given quarter. This measure, which primarily focuses on recently closed and opened positions in a stock, has a better ability to detect trades based on information, compared to changes in
shares held in a stock by institutional investors, which may reflect
trades based on operational needs such as fund flows and portfolio
rebalancing.5
Our results show that hedge funds indeed change their trading
behavior with respect to low book-to-market (growth) and high
book-to-market (value) stocks during April-June period (quarter
q), after book-to-market values become public information during

January-March period (quarter q-1) of year t.6 While the difference in the hedge fund demand between value and growth stocks
during the prior five quarters from q-5 to q-1 (from January of
year t-1 to March of year t) is significantly negative, it becomes
significantly positive in quarter q (April-June period of year t).7
Interestingly, we also document that non-hedge funds alter their
trading preferences with respect to growth and value stocks in
quarter q compared to the previous five quarters, but not to the
same degree as hedge funds do.8 We perceive this change in their
trading direction in quarter q as a signal that hedge funds start to
pay attention to the value premium after the book-to-market values for the entire cross-section of stocks become available to sort
firms into book-to-market portfolios.
The finding that hedge funds change their trading preferences
with respect to growth and value stocks in quarter q does not necessarily imply that they have superior ability to detect mispriced
securities among growth and value stocks compared to other institutional investors. For a more direct test, we focus on the disagreement between hedge funds’ and non-hedge funds’ trading in quarter q with respect to book-to-market effect, and examine whether
such disagreement predicts the future stock returns. Our focus on
disagreement is motivated by the fact that future abnormal returns of a stock that hedge funds buy (sell) cannot be attributed to
hedge funds’ superior stock picking ability if other types of institutions buy (sell) the same stock contemporaneously. To this end,
we conduct independently sorted trivariate portfolio tests based on
the book-to-market ratio as well as the trading direction of hedge
funds and non-hedge funds simultaneously.
We find that hedge funds have better ability to detect mispriced
growth stocks compared to non-hedge funds.9 In particular, growth
stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold
by hedge funds in the most recent quarter q (the April-June period), underperform significantly in the next year, generating statistically significant three- and four- factor alphas of —1.21% and
-1.02% per month, respectively. Moreover, this result cannot be attributed to any price pressure, as the change in aggregate number
of institutions as well as the change in the percentage of shares
held by institutions for these aforementioned growth stocks are
positive in quarter q. On the other hand, we do not find any significant negative subsequent abnormal returns for growth stocks
heavily bought by hedge funds and simultaneously sold by nonhedge funds, indicating no evidence of an ability to detect overpriced growth stocks for non-hedge funds.
Looking at high book-to-market (value) stocks, we find somewhat weaker evidence of hedge funds detecting underpriced securities. That is, high book-to-market stocks heavily sold by nonhedge funds and simultaneously bought by hedge funds do not
generate as statistically significant risk-adjusted returns (in abso-

lute terms) in the following year as those observed in growth
stocks. One plausible explanation for this difference in the results
for overpriced vs. underpriced securities could be the asymmetry
in arbitrage. The arbitrage of overpricing may take a long time due
to short-selling constraints, whereas the arbitrage of underpricing
is likely to be much easier as it only requires buying those under
priced securities. Due to this asymmetry in arbitrage, underpricing
dissipates much faster than overpricing.10
In an effort to see what hedge funds capture in overpriced
growth stocks, we examine and compare the characteristics of
these stocks sold by- to the ones bought by hedge funds within
the growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds. Although
there are some minor differences in the characteristics, including
book-to-market ratios, size, price, demand, idiosyncratic volatility,
illiquidity, intangible returns, and standardized earnings surprises
across the two groups, controlling for these stock characteristics
in multivariate Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions does not eliminate the predictive power of hedge fund trading (demand) on the
cross-sectional variation in future stock returns. This suggests that
hedge funds are able to detect negative information about overpriced growth stocks better than other institutions, but this information is not confined to any specific stock characteristic that we
consider.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature review. Section 3 provides information on data and variables
and offers some summary statistics on hedge fund and non-hedge
fund trading. Section 4 examines the change in trading preferences
of hedge funds and non- hedge funds with respect to book-tomarket effect before and after book-to-market values become public information. Section 5 presents the return predictability tests
conditional on the book-to-market ratio and the disagreement between hedge funds’ and non-hedge funds’ trades. Section 6 provides results from some robustness tests. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2. Literature review

The previous literature on institutional investors and their reaction to book-to-market effect reveals that institutions as a whole
group tend to trade in the direction that exacerbates the value premium. Among the earlier studies, Frazzini and Lamont (2008) show
that money tends to flow out of value-oriented mutual funds and
into growth-oriented funds, inducing fund managers to sell value
stocks and purchase growth stocks. They argue that value effect
might be due to investor capital flowing into funds holding growth
stocks. In a more specific context, examining the impact of institutional trading on book-to-market effect, Jiang (2010) reveals that
the value effect increases with the intensity of institutional trading.
More recently, Edelen et al. (2016) find evidence that institutions
do not exploit the anomaly-predicted returns; and in fact, show
that institutions buy growth stocks significantly more compared to
value stocks, and those growth stocks heavily bought by institutions underperform in the subsequent periods. Different from the
studies above, in this paper we focus on a sub-group of institu-

tional investors, mainly hedge funds, and examine whether they
trade differently from other institutions with respect to book-tomarket effect.
The explosive growth of hedge fund industry over the last two
decades has yielded several studies on hedge funds’ role in stock
market efficiency. The findings from the previous literature provide
good reasons to believe that hedge funds may act differently from
non-hedge funds in the context of book-to-market effect. Among
the ones closely related to our study, Akbas et al. (2015) show that
flows to hedge funds reduce aggregate mispricing while aggregate
flows to mutual funds exacerbate mispricing. In another recent
study, Jiao and Ye (2014) examine the interaction between hedge
fund and mutual fund herding, and find that mutual fund herding follows hedge fund herding, leading to a sharp price reversal
in the following quarter; whereas hedge fund herding itself does
not destabilize prices. Moreover, Cao et al. (2017) find evidence
that hedge funds hold undervalued securities with large positive
alphas, and show that hedge funds’ holdings and trades are informative about the future stock returns. Similarly, Kokkonen and
Suominen (2015) provide evidence that hedge funds’ trades help
reduce the undervaluation. In an earlier study, Brunnermeir and
Nagel (2004), using holdings information of 53 hedge funds, show
that hedge funds were able to trade in the right direction to a
great extent both during formation and burst of the tech bubble.11
In this study, by using 13F filings of hedge funds, we analyze the
response of hedge funds to the book-to-market effect. Our study
contributes to the literature by showing that hedge funds’ trade
direction changes after book-to-market values become public information.
Our study is also related to previous literature on hedge funds
that analyzes the risk and peculiar characteristics of hedge funds
that help them generate higher risk-adjusted returns compared
to non-hedge funds. Joenvaara and Kahra (2017) provide a comprehensive summary on return-based and fund characteristicsbased predictors for future hedge fund performance. Titman and
Tiu (2011) find that hedge funds with low R-squares on factors
have higher Sharpe ratios. Sun et al. (2012) propose a measure of
the distinctiveness of a fund’s investment strategy (SDI) and find
that higher SDl is associated with better subsequent performance.
Bollen and Whaley (2009) and Patton and Ramadorai (2013) both
document that hedge fund risk exposures are time-varying.12 In
line with these studies, we find that hedge funds’ exposure to high
and low book-to-market stocks are time-varying as well. Moreover, we show that the growth stocks that are heavily bought by
non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds experience significant losses in the following year, providing evidence
that hedge funds have better ability to detect mispricing within
the context of book-to-market anomaly.13

3. Data, variable definitions, and summary statistics

In this section, we describe the data and the construction of
variables as well as provide a basic comparison between hedge
funds and other institutions in regards to their trading behavior.

The institutional holdings data in Thomson-Reuters starts in De
cember 1980 and we measure the institutional demand for the first
time in the calendar quarter that ends in June of 1982. The full pe
riod of our return tests span 384 months from July of 1982 to June
of 2014.

3.1. Sample and data

3.2. Summary statistics of hedge fund vs. non-hedge fund trading

We obtain the data on stock prices and returns from the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Monthly Stock File. The accounting data are from CRSP/Compustat Merged Database. We include only US common stocks (CRSP share code of 10 or 11) traded
on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. We exclude stocks with negative
book equity values. We eliminate stocks with share prices less than
$5 at the end of every June to alleviate the bid-ask bounce effect.
We define the book-to-market ratio of a firm in June of year
t by dividing the total book value of equity at the fiscal year end
of a firm in year t-1 with total market value of equity at the end
of calendar year t-1. The total book value of equity is measured
by subtracting preferred stock value from the shareholder’s equity.
We use stockholder’s equity (SEQ) to measure shareholder’s equity.
If stockholder’s equity is missing, we use the sum of total common
equity (CEQ) and preferred stock par value (PSTK). If shareholder’s
equity is still missing, we subtract total liabilities from total assets
to measure the shareholder’s equity. If any of these three ways do
not yield any shareholder’s equity measure, we treat it as missing
for that firm in that year. For preferred stock value, we use redemption value (PSTKRV), liquidating value (PSTKL) and par value
(PSTK) depending on availability in that order. If all three preferred
stock values are missing, we treat book value of equity as missing.
Finally, we add the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment
credit (TXDITC) to the book value of equity, if they are not missing.
We obtain quarterly data on institutional holdings from the
CDA/Spectrum database maintained by Thomson-Reuters. Institutions with greater than $100 million under discretionary management are required to report their equity holdings to SEC if they
have more than either 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value.
We match hedge fund names obtained from Lipper Trading Advisor Selection System (TASS) database with the institution names
in 13F filings to generate the hedge fund holdings data.14’15 The
holdings information in 13F is filed at the advisory firm (manager)
level rather than at the individual hedge fund level, and an advisor
can advise multiple funds. We believe that the advisory firm level
position openings and closings can better reflect the manager’s information. Therefore, the advisory firm level data is appropriate for
this study as we are interested in trading behavior of hedge fund
managers with respect to the book-to-market effect.16

Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of institutional trading for
hedge funds and non-hedge funds separately, where reported
statistics are computed as the time-series averages of the crosssectional means and medians. The average number of hedge funds
in our quarterly analysis is 196, corresponding to 12.06% of the
total number of institutional investors in our sample. This figure ranges from 44 in early years to 382 during the more recent period. Meanwhile, the average number of stocks in a hedge
fund (non-hedge) portfolio is 314 (237). Following Carhart (1997),
we compute the turnover of each institution by scaling the quarterly purchases or sales, whichever is smaller, to total assets. This
methodology, using the minimum of sales or purchases, is able to
detect fund trading mostly unrelated to the fund inflows or outflows. We find that turnover measures of hedge funds are on average 50% larger than that of other institutions. Additionally, we
aggregate each fund’s purchases and sales across stocks in a given
quarter. For both buys and sells, we find that hedge funds’ trades
are almost twice as large in volume as those of other institutions.
These are consistent with Griffin and Xu (2009) who find similar
differences for hedge funds in terms of number of stocks, turnover,
and size of long equity positions. Altogether, these patterns indicate that hedge funds’ trades constitute an important portion of
the stock market.
4. Hedge fund vs. non-hedge fund demand based on
book-to-market

In this section, we explore how institutional investors, with a
special focus on hedge funds, modify their portfolios over time
with respect to the anomalous pattern in stock returns associated
with the book-to-market ratio.
Jiang (2010) tracks changes in total institutional ownership during a four-quarter period from July of year t-1 to June of year
t. Similarly, Edelen et al. (2016) analyze changes in institutional
ownership during a six-quarter period from January of year t-1
to June of year t. These periods encompass the realization of bookto-market values over the year t-1, the announcement of book-tomarket values during the period from January to March of year t,
and the three months following the full public disclosure of bookto-market values (the period from April to June of year t). Both
Jiang (2010) and Edelen et al. (2016) analyze the implications of
institutional demand for stock returns by measuring portfolio returns in the following year from the beginning of July of year t to
the end of June of year t+ 1 (i.e., the return measurement window
of the anomaly returns).
Jiang (2010), Dasgupta et al. (2011), and Edelen et al. (2016) and
papers on herding measures such as Wermers (1999) use the
change in number of institutions to create measures of trading
intensity.17 Similarly, we use the change in the number of insti
tutions (A#inst) to measure the institutional demand for a stock
in a given quarter.18 Following Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) and

Table 1
Descriptive statistics of institutional trading: Hedge funds vs. Non-hedge funds
This table presents the summary statistics of the sample partitioned into two groups, namely, hedge funds and other institutions excluding hedge funds. Hedge funds in
Thomson Reuter’s 13f filings are determined by matching the names of hedge funds from the Lipper TASS dataset. Institutional holdings are derived using quarterly equity
holdings reports (13f) from CDA/Spectrum database of Thomson Financials. The mean number of institutions, mean and median of number of stocks, turnover, buys (in
millions), sales (in millions), and next quarter return calculated based on trades in the prior quarter are reported for both hedge funds and other institutions, separately.
Following Carhart (1997), turnover is calculated as the ratio of the minimum of the total sales and total buys to the average of the current and previous quarter's total
assets. The sample period is 1982 to 2013.

No of stocks in
portfolio

period

1982-1985
1986-1989
1990-1993
1994-1997

1998-2001
2002-2005

2006-2009

2010-2013

1982-2013

Turnover
Min( Buys,Sales)/Assets

Buys (in millions)

Sales (in millions)

Next Quarter Return
based on trades

Type

No of
Institutions

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Non Hedge Fund
Hedge Fund
Non Hedge Fund
Hedge Fund
Non Hedge Fund
Hedge Fund
Non Hedge Fund
Hedge Fund
Non Hedge Fund
Hedge Fund
Non Hedge Fund
Hedge Fund
Non Hedge Fund
Hedge Fund
Non Hedge Fund
Hedge Fund

567
44
759
69
899
95
1082
130
1427
212
1733
284
2321
382
2647
351

189
259
220
290
235
288
264
359
269
376
256
336
238
313
222
293

121
158
122
173
114
150
113
148
110
121
95
105
86
85
79
80

9.39%
12.59%
10.73%
13.92%
9.42%
14.17%
10.62%
17.51%
11.50%
20.98%
11.67%
22.59%
13.03%
23.64%
12.29%
21.23%

7.11%
10.85%
7.97%
12.52%
6.75%
11.95%
7.69%
14.32%
7.76%
17.15%
6.96%
18.33%
8.15%
19.84%
7.35%
16.85%

98.03
203.26
131.96
284.72
147.99
290.03
258.74
537.14
493.03
975.14
333.13
654.95
398.07
814.62
316.36
689.96

34.88
90.98
40.75
134.43
35.89
121.72
44.37
175.56
58.47
203.43
39.78
163.99
45.71
163.38
38.70
144.70

92.06
183.04
130.61
287.65
131.23
258.36
230.71
477.39
444.44
874.83
301.51
600.91
372.64
759.82
311.70
671.66

32.25
73.94
41.49
129.27
34.47
119.98
42.05
151.97
55.68
191.61
37.76
138.72
44.16
153.13
39.09
143.08

0.28%
0.86%
0.20%
0.53%
0.14%
0.38%
0.20%
0.48%
0.76%
0.93%
0.22%
0.57%
0.39%
0.29%
-0.03%
-0.01%

Non Hedge Fund
Hedge Fund

1429
196

237
314

105
127

11.08%
18.33%

7.47%
15.22%

272.16
556.23

42.32
149.77

251.86
514.21

40.87
137.71

0.27%
0.50%

Edelen et al. (2016), we also scale the change in the number of institutional investors in a given quarter by the average number of
the same group institutional investors holding stocks in the same
market capitalization decile based on NYSE breakpoints.19 In our
study, we focus on hedge fund vs. non-hedge fund demand particularly in quarter q (April-June period of year t) after the book-tomarket values become public information in quarter q-1, and analyze the implications of hedge fund and non-hedge fund demand
on stock returns by looking at the next year portfolio returns in
the same way as Jiang (2010) and Edelen et al. (2016). In Fig. 1,
we provide a detailed picture of the timeline for measuring institutional demand and the following return measurement windw for
our study as well as Jiang (2010) and Edelen et al. (2016).
In Table 2, we present evidence on how institutional demand varies over time and across stocks with different book-tomarket ratios while paying particular attention to hedge funds.
Over the six quarters from January of year t-1 to June of year t
(i.e., from quarter q-5 to quarter q in Table 2), institutional demand is greater for growth stocks than value stocks, consistent
with Jiang (2010) and Edelen et al. (2016). We find that both
hedge funds and non-hedge funds act similarly and invest more in
growth stocks compared to value stocks during the same period.
Then, we divide the aforementioned six-quarter period into two
sub-periods, and examine the institutional demand for the first
five quarters (i.e., from quarter q-5 to quarter q-1), and for the
last quarter q, just prior to the return measurement window, separately. We find for both hedge funds and non-hedge funds that the
difference in average quarterly demand between value and growth
stocks is negative and highly significant (in favor of growth stocks)

Median
0.41%
1.05%
0.28%
0.69%
0.14%
0.50%
0.22%
0.38%
0.43%
0.85%
0.22%
0.54%
0.36%
0.35%
-0.04%
-0.01%
0.25%
0.54%

in the first five quarters from quarter q-5 to q-1. Interestingly, we
also notice for both hedge funds and non-hedge funds during the
same time period that the difference in average quarterly demand
between growth and neutral (quintile 3) stocks is significantly pos
itive, while the difference in average quarterly demand between
value and neutral stocks is significantly negative. In other words,
both hedge fund and non-hedge fund demand decrease monoton
ically as we move from growth to value stocks during the period
from q-5 to q-1.
In quarter q, however, hedge funds change their trading preferences drastically with respect to growth and value stocks. In this
quarter, the difference in average quarterly hedge fund demand between value and growth stocks becomes positive and significant
in favor of value stocks at 3.89% with a t-statistic of 3.63. Similarly, the difference in average quarterly hedge fund demand between growth and neutral stocks also changes signs and becomes
significantly negative in quarter q, while the difference in average
quarterly hedge fund demand between value and neutral stocks
changes signs and becomes significantly positive.29 That is, hedge
fund demand this time increases monotonically as we move from
growth to value stocks in quarter q. On the other hand, for nonhedge funds, in quarter q, although the difference in average quarterly demand between value and growth firms gets much smaller
in magnitude, it remains still negative at -0.84% and statistically
significant at the 5% level in favor of growth stocks.
In panel A of Fig. 2, we plot the difference in average quarterly
demand between value and growth stocks in each of the six quarters, q-5 to q for hedge funds and non-hedge funds separately.
This difference is negative in all of the first five quarters from
q-5 to q-1 for both hedge funds and non-hedge funds, indicating a higher demand for growth stocks compared to value stocks.
In quarter q, however, the demand difference flips sign only for

Institutional Demand in
Jiang (2010)

Previous4 quarters

I!
i
i
Dec 31, t-2 June 30, t-1

B/M ratios become public
information
1
1
Dec 31, t-1

Measure demand by
hedge funds

1
1
Mar 31, t April, May, June
Quarter q

Institutional Demand in
Edelen et al. (2016)

Portfolio returns
1
1
June 30, t+1

Juiie30, t

---------------------------------- 7

\
Portfolios based on B/M

Fig. 1. Timeline for the construction of portfolios based on the book-to-market and institutional trading
Portfolios are constructed at the end of June of year t based on book-to-market ratios as of fiscal year end in year t-1. In Jiang (2010), the institutional demand is measured
over four calendar quarters from the end of June of year t-1 to the end of June of year t. In Edelen et al. (2016), institutional demand is measured over six calendar quarters
from the end of December of year t-2 to the end of June of year t. In this study, institutional demand is measured separately for quarter q, the most recent quarter prior to
the return measurement window, covering April, May, and June of year t. The portfolio holding period returns are measured over 12 months from the end of June of year t
to the end of June of year t+1.
Table 2
Institutional demand over time for book-to-market quintiles
At the end of June of year t, five quintile portfolios are formed on the basis of book-to-market ratios measured based on the information at the end of December of
year t-1. This table reports the average hedge fund demand, non-hedge fund demand, and total institutional demand for each book-to-market quintile for the quarter(s)
q-5 to q, q-5 to q-1, and q, where q is the quarter from the beginning of April of year t to the end of June of year t. The difference in demand between high and low
book-to-market quintiles, high and neutral book-to-market quintiles, low and neutral book-to-market quintiles are also presented. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
adjusted t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Hedge fund (Non-hedge fund) demand for each stock is measured as the change in the number of hedge funds (non-hedge
funds) holding the stock from the prior quarter scaled by the average number of hedge funds (non-hedge funds) holding stocks within the same market capitalization
decile as of the March of year t. Similarly, institutional demand for each stock is measured as the change in the number of institutions holding the stock from the prior
quarter scaled by the average number of institutions holding stocks within the same market capitalization decile as of the March of year t. All variables are winsorized at
1% level. The sample period is from June 1982 to June 2013. The numbers in bold denote significance at the 1% level.

Growth (low B/M)
2
3 (Neutral)
4
Value (high B/M)

Value - Growth
t-statistic
Growth - Neutral
t-statistic
Value - Neutral
t-statistic

Total institutional Demand

Non-hedge fund demand

Hedge fund demand

[q-5, q-1]

q (April - June)]

[q-5, q]

[q-5, q-1]

q (April-June)]

[q-5, q]

[q-5, q-1]

q (April - June)]

9.22%
6.63%
5.50%
4.76%
3.78%

9.97%
6.73%
4.94%
4.13%
2.40%

4.40%
4,77%
6.15%
6.39%
8.28%

8.30%
6.23%
4.41%
3.25%
1.84%

8.66%
6.35%
4.28%
2.96%
1.21%

4.92%
4.45%
4.08%
3.85%
4.08%

8.42%
6.27%
4.55%
3.48%
2.14%

8.86%
6.40%
4.38%
3.14%
1.41%

4.82%
4.50%
4.41%
4.22%
4.69%

-5.45%
(-6.58)

-7.58%
(-6.23)

3.89%
(3.63)

-6.46%
(-7.74)

-7.45%
(-7.70)

-0.84%
(-2.08)

-6.28%
(-7.61)

-7.45%
(-7.64)

-0.13%
(-0.39)

3.73%
(6.78)

5.04%
(6.16)

-1.75%
(-3.12)

3.89%
(6.50)

4.38%
(6.76)

0.84%
(1.92)

3.87%
(6.61)

4.48%
(6.81)

0.41%
(104)

-1.72%
(-5.16)

-2.54%
(-5.80)

2.14%
(2.92)

-2.57%
(-8.75)

-3.07%
(-8.64)

-0.01%
(-0.02)

-2.42%
(-8.19)

-2.97%

0.28%
(1.00)

[q-5, q]

hedge funds, indicating in fact a higher demand for value stocks
compared to growth stocks by hedge funds. On the other hand,
although the magnitude of the demand difference gets smaller, it
still remains negative in quarter q for non-hedge funds.
Panels B and C of Fig. 2 plot the differences in average quarterly demand between growth and neutral stocks, and between
value and neutral stocks, respectively, for each six quarters, again
for hedge funds and non-hedge funds separately. The relative demand (relative to neutral stocks) for growth stocks decreases after quarter q-2 for both hedge funds and non-hedge funds, but
it switches from positive to negative in quarter q only for hedge
funds. As can be seen in panel C of Fig. 2, the trend in relative demand for value stocks over quarters q-2 to q is similar, but in the
opposite direction, with relative demand for value stocks switching
from negative to positive only for hedge funds in quarter q.

(-8.41)

These findings support our conjecture that hedge funds change
their trading behavior with respect to growth and value stocks
in quarter q, after book-to-market values become public information at the end of quarter q-1. Non-hedge funds also decrease (increase) their demand for growth (value) stocks in quarter q, but
not to the same degree as hedge funds do.
5. Return predictability

5.1. Book-to-market effect and disagreement between hedge funds
and others

After observing that both hedge funds and non-hedge funds
in general change their trading in the same direction away from
growth to value stocks in quarter q, in this section, we examine
whether hedge funds or non-hedge funds are more capable of de-

Fig. 2. Difference in demand between value and growth stocks over time for hedge funds and non-hedge funds
At the end of June of year t, five quintile portfolios are formed on the basis of book-to-market ratios measured based on the information at the end of December of year
t-1. Panel A illustrates the difference in demand between value and growth stocks for hedge funds and non-hedge funds separately for each quarter from q-5 to q, where q
is the quarter from the beginning of April of year t to the end of June of year t. Panels R and C of Figure 2 plot the difference in average quarterly demand between growth
and neutral (book-to-market quintile 3) stocks and between value and neutral stocks, respectively, for hedge funds and non-hedge funds over the quarters q-5 to q. Hedge
fund (Non-hedge fund) demand for each stock is measured as the change in the number of hedge funds (non-hedge funds) holding the stock from the prior quarter scaled
by the average number of hedge funds (non-hedge funds) holding stocks within the same market capitalization decile. The sample period is from June 1982 to June 2013.

Table 3
Independently sorted portfolios based on institutional demand and book-to-market:
Hedge funds vs. Non-hedge funds
At the end of June of year t, stocks are first independently sorted into quintiles
based on the book-to-market ratios and the most recent quarter (quarter q) of nonhedge funds’ trades. Then, within the top 20% (heavy buy) and bottom 20% (heavy
sell) of non-hedge funds’ trades, two sub-portfolios are created based on whether
hedge funds buy or sell. For completeness of the analysis, the sorting procedure is
also reversed, and this time stocks are independently sorted into quintiles based on
the book-to-market ratios and the most recent quarter (quarter q) of hedge funds'
trades. Then, within the top 20% (heavy buy) and bottom 20% (heavy sell) of hedge
funds’ trades, two sub-portfolios are created based on whether non-hedge funds
buy or sell. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of June of each calendar year. For
each sorting procedure, this table reports for the next one year (from July of year
t to the end of June t + 1) the monthly CAPM alphas, Fama-French (1993) threefactor alphas, Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas and DGTW characteristic-adjusted
returns for the four selected corner portfolios out of the 50 portfolios generated
from the three-way independent sorting scheme. The sample period is July 1982 to
June 2014. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted t-statistics are reported
in parentheses. The numbers in bold denote significance at the 1% level.
Panel A. Low book-to-market firms, Heavy Buy

HF heavy buy

NONHF heavy buy

# of stocks
CAPM alpha
t-stat
3-factor alpha
t-stat
4-factor alpha
t-stat
Char. Adj. Ret.
t-stat

HF sell

HF buy

24
-1.29%
(-5.03)
-1.21%
(-5.53)
-1.02%
(-5.38)
-0.72%
(—3.63)

83
-0.41%
(-1.85)
-0.20%
(-1.21)
-0.10%
(-0.57)
0.14
(0.91)

B-S

NONHF se 11

NONHF buy

B-S

0.88%
(3.90)
1.01%
(3.96)
0.92%
(3.97)
0.85
(3.72)

29
-0.60%
(-1.87)
-0.43%
(-1.68)
-0.05%
(-0.16)
-0.09%
(-0.39)

97
-0.50%
(-2.31)
-0.30%
(-2.21)
-0.16%
(-1.08)
-0.02%
(-0.13)

0.10%
(0.38)
0.13%
(0.48)
-0.12%
(-0.39)
0.07%
(0.29)

Panel B. High book-to-market firms, Heavy Sell

NONHF heavy sell

# of stocks
CAPM alpha
t-stat
3-factor alpha
t-stat
4-factor alpha
t-stat
Char. Adj. Ret.
t-stat

HF heavy sell

HF sell

HF buy

B-S

NONHF sell

NONHF buy

B-S

44
0.24%
(0.95)
-0.13%
(-0.85)
0.18%
(1.22)
0.02%
(0.05)

44
0.47%
(2.12)
0.18%
(1.32)
0.35%
(2.54)
0.04
(0.31)

0.23%
(1.40)
0.30%
(1.85)
0.17%
(1.04)
0.02
(0.15)

52
0.15%
(0.65)
-0.20%
(-1.52)
0.06%
(0.50)
-0.13%
(-1.00)

47
0.34%
(1.51)
0.00%
(0.02)
0.13%
(0.97)
-0.10%
(-0.92)

0.19%
(1.39)
0.20%
(1.40)
0.06%
(0.44)
0.03%
(0.22)

tecting mispriced securities in relation to book-to-market anomaly.
This type of analysis, however, requires focusing on stocks for
which different sets of investors disagree about the mispricing.
For this purpose, we first independently sort stocks into quintiles
based on the book-to-market ratios and the most recent quarter (quarter q) of non-hedge funds’ demand. Then, within the
top 20% (heavy buy) and bottom 20% (heavy sell) of non-hedge
funds’ demand for growth and value stocks, we further create
two portfolios contemporaneously based on whether hedge funds’
demand is positive (buy) or negative (sell). For completeness of
the analysis, we also reverse the sorting procedure and independently sort stocks into quintiles based on the book-to-market ratios and the most recent quarter (quarter q) of hedge funds’ demand. Then, within the top 20% (heavy buy) and bottom 20%
(heavy sell) of hedge funds’ demand for growth and value stocks,
we further create two portfolios simultaneously based on whether
non-hedge funds buy or sell. We rebalance these portfolios at
the end of every June. The sample period for our return tests
cover 384 months from July 1982 to June 2014. Table 3 reports
the average number of stocks (within each portfolio) as well as
the average monthly CAPM, three-factor, four-factor alphas and
Daniel et al. (1997) (hereafter, DGTW) characteristic-adjusted returns along with heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics of these al-

ternative portfolios over the one-year return measurement window
(from July of year t to June of year t+ I), where hedge fund and
non-hedge fund trading (demand) agree and/or disagree in quarter
q.21
Two striking results come to the surface out of this analysis.
First, low book-to-market (growth) stocks heavily bought (high demand) by non-hedge funds and contemporaneously sold (low demand) by hedge funds in the most recent quarter significantly underperform in the following year those growth stocks heavily purchased by non-hedge funds and simultaneously bought by hedge
funds. The CAPM, three-, four-factor alphas and characteristicadjusted returns of this underperformance are 0.88% (t-stat = 3.90),
1.01% (t-stat = 3.96), 0.92% (t-stat = 3.97) and 0.85% (t-stat = 3.72),
respectively (see the B-S column on the left part of Panel A of
Table 3). Second, the underperformance is completely driven by
the poor performance of those stocks sold by hedge funds. The
CAPM, three-, four-factor alphas and characteristic-adjusted returns
of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds are -1.29% (t-stat = -5.03), -1.21% (tstat= -5.53), -1.02% (t-stat =-5.38) and -0.72% (t-stat =-3.63),
respectively.22,23 On the other hand, within the sample of low
book-to-market growth stocks heavily bought by hedge funds,
there is no significant difference in subsequent abnormal performances between stocks sold and stocks bought by non-hedge
funds (see the B-S column on the right part of Panel A of Table 3).
We also repeat our main analysis for a sample of hedge funds
with equity-based strategies only, by excluding Fixed Income Ar
bitrage, CTAs, Managed Futures, and Emerging Market style funds
from our sample. We find that the results from this new equitybased strategy only sample remain very similar to the results reported in Table 3. 24 These findings altogether suggest that hedge
funds have superior ability to detect the overpriced growth stocks
compared to non-hedge funds.25 Notice also in Table 3 that among
growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds, the average
number of stocks in the portfolio where hedge funds and nonhedge funds disagree (24) is much smaller compared to the number of stocks in the portfolio where they agree (83), suggesting that disagreement is much less common than agreement, and
these rare instances of disagreement presents an opportunity to

21 The CAPM, three, and four-factor alphas are generated from the single factor
CAPM, 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993), and 4-factor model of Fama and
French (1993) and Carhart (1997), respectively. The characteristic- adjusted returns
for each stock in each month is computed as the return difference between a stock
and a portfolio of stocks that have comparable characteristics in terms of size, industry adjusted book-to-market value, and prior returns. For complete details, refer
to Daniel et al. (1997).
22 Note that these results on low book-to-market stocks are not driven from the
inclusion of the HML factor in the estimation of three- and four-factor alphas. Excluding the HML factor in estimation of the three- and four-factor alphas generate
similar in magnitude negative and statistically significant alphas for those growth
stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds.
23 It should be noted that this significant underperformance is not driven by outlier stock returns. When we exclude the most negative and the most positive returns within this portfolio each month, the monthly three- and four-factor alphas
turn out to be -1.38% and -1.21%, respectively, with the corresponding t-statistics
of -6.25 and -6.36.
24 These results are not tabulated for the sake of brevity, but available upon request.
25 Following Cao et al. (2017), we estimate for our portfolio of interest, the fourfactor alphas of individual securities by using daily returns in quarter q-1. Specifically, we find the average of the four-factor daily alphas of growth stocks sold by
hedge funds and bought by non-hedge funds to be 0.082% in quarter q-1. When
we exclude the stocks with one-tail negative significant alphas from our analysis,
we observe that the subsequent year portfolio returns for the portfolio of growth
stocks sold by hedge funds and bought by non-hedge funds remain qualitatively
unchanged from Table 3.

test the relative ability of hedge funds to detect overpriced growth
securities.26
On the other hand, a similar analysis for value stocks in Panel B
of Table 3 shows that hedge funds’ disagreement with non-hedge
funds do not generate as significant abnormal returns (in absolute
terms) as they do for growth stocks. Within high book-to-market
value stocks heavily sold by non-hedge funds and contemporaneously bought by hedge funds, we observe a monthly CAPM and
four-factor alpha of 0.47% (t-stat = 2.12) and 0.35% (t-stat = 2.54),
respectively. However, the same figure turns out to be insignificant
for the three-factor model and characteristic-adjusted returns, indicating a somewhat weaker evidence of hedge funds’ ability to
detect underpriced value securities. Lastly, in our analysis within
the sample of high book-to-market value stocks heavily sold by
hedge funds, we find no significant difference in subsequent abnormal performances between stocks sold and stocks bought by
non-hedge funds (see the B-S column on the right part of Panel B
of Table 3).27
In sum, we find evidence indicating that hedge funds have su
perior ability to detect overpriced growth stocks compared to nonhedge funds. However, we find no significant evidence of such ability when it comes to detecting underpriced value stocks. This difference in our findings, however, can be explained by the asymmetry in arbitrage. Due to short selling constraints, overpricing
can persist for some time, while underpricing is likely to dissipate
quickly as there are no constraints to buying stocks.

5.2. Do stock characteristics explain what hedge funds capture?
In the previous section, we show that hedge funds are better able to detect over-priced stocks with low book-to-market ratios. In this section, we attempt to understand if the differences in
stock returns during the return measurement window are due to
the behavior of the two types of institutions or simply due to differences in stock characteristics. In other words, we investigate if
hedge funds are paying attention to some public information that
non-hedge funds do not. For this purpose, we compare the characteristics of the stocks sold by hedge funds to the characteristics of
stocks bought by hedge funds within the group of growth stocks
heavily bought by non-hedge funds in quarter q.
We take into account a broad range of characteristics including hedge fund demand, non-hedge fund demand, and total institutional demand both in quarter q and during quarters q-5 to
q-2. We also compare for the portfolios of interest, the book-tomarket ratio, firm size, share price, illiquidity, idiosyncratic volatility, past one-year intangible return, momentum, and standardized earnings surprises (SUE). Lastly, we also evaluate raw and
market-adjusted cumulative stock returns for the portfolios of interest for quarter q and quarter q-1, separately. For illiquidity,
we use Amihud (2002) stock illiquidity measure, which is de-

fined as the ratio of the absolute return to the dollar trading volume averaged over the three months in quarter q. To measure
idiosyncratic volatility, we use the standard deviation of residuals from the regressions of daily stock returns on Fama and
French (1993) three factor model over the three months in quarter q. For intangible returns, we follow Daniel and Titman (2006),
and estimate it as the residual of the annual cross-sectional regressions of log stock returns on the lagged log book-to-market ratio
and past one-year book returns of stocks. Momentum is defined as
the past 12 months’ cumulative stock returns excluding the most
recent month. Finally, for standardized earnings surprises (SUE),
we follow Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), and compute SUE as
SUEi,q = (Ei,q-Ei,q-4)/Stdi,q, where Ei,q is the earnings for firm i in
quarter q, and stdi,q is the standard deviation of the (Ei,q-Ei,q-4)
over the prior eight quarters.
Table 4 presents the time-series averages of the mean, median,
first and last quartiles of the characteristics of the portfolios of interest. First, among growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge
funds, we observe that stocks sold by hedge funds in quarter q
have a lower demand by non-hedge funds in the same quarter
as well (30.32% vs. 37.17%). Among growth stocks heavily bought
by non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds, we
also see that the total institutional demand in quarter q is positive (16.34%), suggesting that the consequent significant underperformance of these low book-to-market stocks cannot be explained
by any price pressure. In addition, in Table 4 we also notice that
for those stocks that are sold by hedge funds in quarter q, the institutional demand during the preceding five quarters (from q-5
to q-1) is noticeably stronger compared to those stocks bought by
hedge funds (14.83% vs. 10.34%). Interestingly, we observe a similar pattern in the preceding five quarters in both hedge fund demand (26.31% vs. 12.25%) and non-hedge fund demand (12.63% vs.
10.01%). In other words, those growth stocks that are sold by hedge
funds in quarter q tend to be the stocks that have been subject to
stronger institutional demand during the preceding five quarters.
Our results, however, do not reveal an outstanding difference in
book-to-market ratio, firm size, share price, illiquidity and idiosyncratic volatility between stocks sold and stocks bought by hedge
funds among the group of growth stocks heavily bought by nonhedge funds. It is worth noting that the average market capitalization of stocks sold by hedge funds is $726 million, which is approximately equivalent to the third NYSE size decile. As small firms
face greater short-selling constraints, this provides support for our
explanation of overpricing of growth stocks for which hedge funds
and non-hedge funds disagree. Lastly, for stocks sold by hedge
funds, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure of 0.191 is almost
half of the illiquidity measure of 0.351 averaged over all growth
stocks. This further suggests that illiquidity does not seem to be a
main driving force behind the significant underperformance of the
portfolio of interest.
Lastly, we examine when the underperformance of these
growth stocks sold by hedge funds begins. One possibility is that it
begins while hedge funds trade during quarter q or another possibility is that the underperformance begins during quarter q-1
(January to March). These scenarios may cast doubt on our interpretation that hedge funds correctly identify which growth stocks
will underperform. Table 4 shows, however, no evidence for such
an earlier underperformance. In fact, for those growth stocks sold
by hedge funds, the portfolio return in excess of the market return is positive and its magnitude is 3.38% and 5.62% during the
quarters q and q-1, respectively. Furthermore, in quarter q where
we measure institutional demand, stocks sold by hedge funds have
still a positive average earnings surprise (0.77). These results suggest that the growth stocks sold by hedge funds in quarter q, were
not already underperforming during quarters q or q-1, and there
were no signs of negative earnings surprises either. We also find

Table 4
Characteristics of stocks bought vs. stocks sold by hedge funds among growth stocks heavily bought by Non-hedge funds
in quarter q
The table reports the time-series averages of the mean, median, first, and last quartiles of stock characteristics for the
portfolios of stocks sold and stocks bought by hedge funds within the sample of growth stocks heavily bought by nonhedge funds. At the end of June of year t, stocks are first independently sorted into quintiles based on the book-to-market
ratios and the most recent quarter (quarter q) of non-hedge funds' trades. Then, within the top 20% (heavy buy) of nonhedge funds’ trades of growth (low book-to-market) stocks, two sub-portfolios are created based on whether hedge funds
buy or sell. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of June of each calendar year. Hedge fund (Non-hedge fund) demand
for each stock is measured as the change in the number of hedge funds (non-hedge funds) holding the stock from the
prior quarter scaled by the average number of hedge funds (non-hedge funds) holding stocks within the same market
capitalization decile. Similarly, institutional demand for each stock is measured as the change in the number of institutions
holding the stock from the prior quarter scaled by the average number of institutions holding stocks within the same
market capitalization decile. Illiquidity is the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume in
quarter q. Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of residuals of the regression of daily stock returns on Fama and
French (1993) three factor model over the three months in quarter q. Return (q) and Return (q-1) are the cumulative stock
returns over the quarters q and q-1, respectively. Similarly, Excess Return (q) and Excess Return (q-1) are the cumulative
stock returns in excess of the market return over the quarters q and q-1, respectively. The intangible return is the residual
from the regression of the past one-year log returns on the lagged book-to-market ratio and book returns as in Daniel and
Titman (2006). Momentum measures the past 12 months' cumulative returns from July of year t-1 to June of year t. SUE
(q) is computed as the earnings surprise in quarter q scaled by the standard deviation of the earnings surprises over the
prior eight quarters. The earnings surprise in quarter q is measured as the difference between quarter q earnings and
quarter q-4 earnings. The sample period is 1982 to 2013.

Mean

Median

Q3

Q1

HF sell

HF Buy

HF sell

HF Buy

HF sell

HF Buy

HF sell

HF Buy

16.34%
-55.32%
30.32%
14.83%
26.31%
12.63%

41.02%
66.69%
37.17%
10.34%
12.25%
10.01%

13.72%
-44.53%
25.34%
12.34%
22.66%
10.31%

32.83%
49.33%
29.35%
8.68%
9.03%
8.35%

8.59%
-88.32%
18.88%
5.50%
7.78%
3.97%

23.47%
26.93%
20.46%
3.16%
1.42%
3.02%

21.34%
-21.65%
35.17%
21.50%
42.11%
19.49%

55.39%
97.23%
48.63%
16.42%
21.48%
15.61%

B/M
Size (in millions)
Price
Ivol
Illiquidity

0.197
726.42
21.18
0.031
0.191

0.191
1094.58
24.71
0.031
0.174

0.208
312.91
17.19
0.030
0.048

0.199
374.71
20.24
0.029
0.036

0.143
165.10
10.53
0.023
0.019

0.133
182.90
12.35
0.023
0.011

0.255
776.45
28.47
0.038
0.176

0.252
904.16
32.58
0.037
0.128

Intangible return
Momentum
Return (q)
Return (q-1)
Excess Return (q)
Excess Return (q-1)
SUE(q)

44.72%
48.66%
6.69%
9.57%
3.38%
5.62%
0.77

46.32%
76.68%
19.77%
15.48%
16.13%
11.34%
0.97

43.12%
33.34%
5.89%
6.07%
2.39%
2.23%
0.60

45.90%
58.67%
16.65%
11.75%
13.11%
7.57%
0.70

16.27%
-1.01%
-9.80%
-9.74%
-12.70%
-13.18%
-0.17

17.99%
20.31%
1.10%
-3.96%
-2.06%
-7.66%
0.07

75.36%
81.14%
20.65%
24.75%
16.82%
20.41%
1.61

75.25%
118.41%
34.62%
30.23%
30.80%
25.46%
1.89

Δ#inst. (q)
Δ#HF (q)
Δ#NHF (q)
Avg. Δ#inst. (q-5, q-1)
Avg. Δ#HF (q-5, q-1)
Avg. A#NHF (q-5, q-1)

no difference in intangible returns between stocks sold and stocks
bought by hedge funds within the sample of stocks heavily bought
by non-hedge funds (44.72% vs. 46.32%). Lastly, we find the mo
mentum (past 12 months’ cumulative performance excluding the
most recent month) to be somewhat lower for the stocks sold by
hedge funds (48.66% vs. 76.68%), the only category where there
seems to be a difference between stocks sold and stocks bought
by hedge funds.28
We next employ multivariate Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of monthly stock returns on previous quarters’ institutional demand as well as stock characteristics in quarter q, to see
if the above mentioned differences undermine the role of hedge
funds’ superior ability to detect overpriced growth stocks. To explain the monthly individual stock returns in the cross-section, we
use the same aforementioned variables, including hedge fund and
non-hedge fund demand in quarter q, total institutional demand
during the preceding five quarters from quarters q-5 to q-1, the

natural logarithm of firm size at the end of June of year t, the nat
ural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio at the end of December
of year t-1, past 12 month’s cumulative performance excluding the
most recent month, illiquidity, idiosyncratic volatility, the intangible return, and the standardized unexpected earnings at the end
of June of year t. In Table 5, we run three alternative regression
specifications for low book-to-market growth stocks heavily bought
by non-hedge funds. The sample period is July 1982 to June 2014,
covering 384 months. Note that we winsorize all independent variables at the 1% level, and control for heteroscedasticity and serial
correlations in all of our analyses.
Table 5 reports the average slope coefficients along with tstatistics and p-values from the monthly cross-sectional regressions (from July of year t to June of year t+1) of future stock
returns on hedge fund and non-hedge fund demand in quarter
q with and without control variables. The findings from FamaMacBeth cross-sectional regressions confirm our key finding that
hedge funds’ trading (demand) positively predicts the future returns of growth stocks that are heavily bought by non-hedge funds.
In the first model where only hedge fund and non-hedge fund
demand are used as explanatory variables, the slope coefficients
on hedge fund and non-hedge fund demand are 0.006 with a tstatistic of 2.35 and -0.004 with a t-statistic of -0.74, respectively.
In the second model, we add total institutional demand during the
preceding five quarters from quarters q-5 to q-1 to the regression

Table 5
Fama-MacBeth regressions of future stock returns on institutional demand and stock characteristics
within the sample of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds
Within the sample of growth stocks heavily purchased by non-hedge funds, this table reports average coefficient estimates along with their (-statistics (in parenthesis) and p-values from the monthly
cross-sectional regressions (from July of year t through June of t + 1) of future stock returns on
hedge fund and non-hedge fund demand in quarter q and control variables. Hedge fund (Non-hedge
fund) demand in quarter q for each stock is measured as the change in the number of hedge funds
(non-hedge funds) holding the stock from the prior quarter scaled by the average number of hedge
funds (non-hedge funds) holding stocks at the end of q-1 within the same market capitalization
decile. Similarly, institutional demand from q-5 to q-1 for each stock is measured as the change
in the number of institutions holding the stock from q-5 to q-1 scaled by the average number of
institutions holding stocks at the end of q-5 within the same market capitalization decile. The control variables for stock characteristics include (1) natural log of book-to-market ratio, (2) natural log
of firm size, (3) prior 12 months’ cumulative returns (momentum), (4) Illiquidity, (5) Idiosyncratic
volatility, (6) SUE measured in quarter q, and (7) intangible return. All independent variables are
calculated as described in Table 4 as of June end of year t. All independent variables are winsorized
at 1% level. Standard errors are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The sample
period is July 1982 to June 2014. The numbers in bold denote significance at the 1% level.

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Intercept

Δ#HF (q)

Δ#NHF (q)

0.007
(175)
0.081
0.008
(2.11)
0.035
0.015
(2.01)
0.045

0.006
(2.35)

-0.004
(-0.74)
0.460
-0.004
(-0.72)
0.472
0.000
(0.04)
0.970

0.019

0.006
(2.39)
0.018

0.006
(2.85)
0.005

model as well, and find that the coefficient on hedge fund demand
is still 0.006 with a t-statistic of 2.39, indicating that controlling for
the effect of institutional demand during the preceding five quarters does not eradicate the predictive power of quarter q hedge
fund demand on future stock returns. Lastly, in the third model, we
add all stock characteristics, including book-to-market, firm size,
momentum, illiquidity, idiosyncratic volatility, and SUE into our
regression model, and still find a statistically significant relation
between hedge fund demand and subsequent returns; an average
slope coefficient of 0.006 with a t-statistic of 2.85 on hedge fund
demand.29
To sum up, the findings from the cross-sectional regression
analyses confirm our portfolio test results and suggest that hedge
funds’ superior ability to detect overpriced growth stocks is not
driven by other firm characteristics such as size, illiquidity, idiosyn
cratic volatility, SUE and past returns.

5.3. The role of disagreement in the full cross-section of stock returns
The results from the portfolio level analysis show that the disagreement between hedge funds and other institutions in quarter
q play a major role in predicting the future underperformance of
growth stocks. More specifically, growth stocks heavily bought by
other institutions and simultaneously sold by hedge funds in quarter q underperform significantly in the following period. In this
section, using the full cross-section of stock returns, we test for
the existence of a possible asymmetry of such negative underperformance in relation to the growth stocks and institutional demand
over the preceding five quarters from q-5 to q-2.
Table 6 presents results from a set of Fama-MacBeth regressions of future monthly stock returns on the disagreement between hedge funds and other institutions, past institutional demand, and stock characteristics. We first create a Disagreement
dummy variable that is observed at the end of June of year t (quarter q) and takes the value of 1 when a stock is heavily bought

A#inst. (q-5, q-1)

Stock Characteristics
No

-0.002
(-1.49)
0.136
-0.003
(-1.87)
0.063

No

Yes

by non-hedge funds (i.e., top 20% of non-hedge fund demand) and
sold by hedge funds in quarter q, and 0 otherwise. We next create
a Growth dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a stock is in
the lowest book-to-market quintile in quarter q, and 0 otherwise.
Our measure of institutional demand from q-5 to q-2, Ainst(q-5,
q-2), is the scaled change in the number of institutions for a stock
over the five quarters from q-5 to q-2. We also create a High Insti
tutional Demand dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a stock
is in the top Ainst(q-5, q-2) quintile in quarter q, and 0 otherwise. We include in the regression models the interaction terms of
the dummy variables to capture any asymmetries as well. Lastly, in
all of the cross-sectional regressions, we include control variables
including, the natural log of firm size, the natural log of book-tomarket ratio, the return over the past one year excluding the most
recent month ending in May of year t, the illiquidity measure, the
idiosyncratic volatility, the standardized earnings surprises, and the
intangible return.30 The independent variables are updated at the
end of June of year t. Thus, they are the same for 12 monthly regressions from July of year t to June of year t + I. Coefficient estimates in Table 6 are time-series averages of monthly coefficients,
and t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors
using six-lags.
Model 1 in Table 6 examines the predictive power of the disagreement between hedge funds and non-hedge funds across all
stocks controlling for the stock characteristics. The overall relation
between disagreement and future returns is negative and statistically significant, with an average coefficient of -0.0019 on the
Disagreement dummy and a t-statistic of -2.36. Model 2 examines if this negative relation is symmetric across growth vs. other
stocks, by including the interaction of Disagreement dummy with
Growth dummy in the regression equation. Notably, the coefficient

Table 6
Fama-MacBeth regressions of future stock returns on the disagreement in quarter q, long term institutional demand and stock characteristics
This table reports average coefficient estimates along with their t-statistics (in parenthesis) and p-values from the monthly cross-sectional regressions (from
July of year t through June of t + 1) of future stock returns on the disagreement dummy in quarter q, preceding five quarter institutional demand Δinst(q-5,
q-1), and stock characteristics. The disagreement dummy takes the value of 1 when a stock is heavily bought by non-hedge funds (i.e,, top 20% of nonhedge fund demand) and sold by hedge funds in quarter q, and 0 otherwise. The disagreement dummy variable’s interactions with growth stocks and high
institutional demand are also controlled in regression specifications 2-4. Growth dummy is generated such that it takes the value of 1 if a stock is in the
lowest book-to-market quintile in quarter q, and 0 otherwise. High Institutional Demand dummy is created such that it takes the value of 1 if a stock is in
the top Δinst(q-5, q-1) quintile in quarter q, and 0 otherwise. The control variables for stock characteristics include (1) natural log of book-to-market ratio,
(2) natural log of firm size, (3) prior 12 months' cumulative returns (momentum), (4) Illiquidity, (5) Idiosyncratic volatility, (6) SUE measured in quarter q,
and (7) intangible return. All independent variables are calculated as described in Table 4 as of June end of year t. All continuous independent variables are
winsorized at 1% level. Standard errors are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The sample period is July 1982 to June 2014. The numbers
in bold denote significance at the 1% level.

Model

1

2

3

4

Intercept

Disagreement

0.0154
(4.71)
<0.001
0.0154
(4.70)
<0.001
0.0156
(4.87)
<0.001
0.0156
(4.86)
<0.001

-0.0019
(-2.36)
0.019
-0.0006
(-0.63)
0.526
0.0002
(0.23)
0.816
0.0010
(1.06)
0.290

Disagreement x Growth

Disagreement x High Inst. Demand (q-5, q-1)

Δinst. {q-5,q-1)

Characteristics
Yes

-0.0065
(-3.18)

Yes

0.002

-0.0060

(-3.58)

-0.0018
(-3.26)

<0.001

0.001

-0.0050
(-2.39)

-0.0054
(-3.17)

-0.0018
(-3.26)

0.017

0.002

0.001

on the Disagreement dummy drops to zero and becomes statistically
insignificant, while the interaction term (Disagreement dummy x
Growth dummy) captures the negative predictive power of the disagreement with an average coefficient of -0.0065 and a t-statistic
of -3.18. This asymmetry suggests that the predictive ability of the
disagreement between hedge funds and other institutions in quarter q is limited to growth stocks.
In Model 3, we next include institutional demand over the preceding five quarters, Ainst(q-5, q-1), and the interaction between
Disagreement dummy and High institutional Demand dummy in the
regression equation. We find a significant and negative relation between institutional demand, Ainst(q-5, q-1), and future returns,
which is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Jiang (2010), Dasgupta
et al. (2011), and Edelen et al. (2016)) which document a negative relation between institutional investors’ past long term trading
and future stock returns. Furthermore, we find the interaction term
(Disagreement dummy x High Institutional Demand dummy) has a
larger average coefficient of -0.0060 with a t-statistic of -3.58.
This finding suggests that the negative predictive power of disagreement is also confined to those stocks which have been subject to high level of institutional demand in the past.
Lastly, Model 4 includes interactions of Disagreement dummy
with Growth dummy and Disagreement dummy with High Institutional Demand dummy simultaneously. The results show that the
disagreement-growth relation is robust to the control of past institutional demand. The coefficient on the interaction term (Disagreement dummy x Growth dummy) is -0.0050 with a t-statistic
of -2.39. Hence, any correlation between disagreement in quarter
q and past institutional demand over q-5 to q-1 does not explain
the future underperformance of growth stocks which are heavily bought by non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge
funds in quarter q.
Taken in their entirety, the results in this section show that the
negative relation between disagreement in quarter q and future returns is confined to growth stocks and to those stocks invested
heavily by institutions over the preceding five quarters from q-5
to q-1. However, these two effects do not subsume each other.

Yes

Yes

6. Robustness check

6.1. Quarterly returns
Prior literature provide evidence that the ability of institutional trades predicting future returns depend on the horizons
over which both trading and returns are measured.32 Edelen et al.
(2016) provide evidence that institutions trading in quarter q based
on the anomalies (e.g., buy minus sell portfolios within growth and
value stocks) generates positive alphas confined only to next two
quarters following the portfolio formation, which is consistent with
the price pressure effect rather than the institutional investors’
ability to pick stocks. We examine whether the significant subsequent year underperformance of growth stocks heavily bought by
non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds is driven
by the poor performance in a specific quarter.
Table 7 documents the average monthly CAPM, three-, fourfactor alphas and DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns for the
portfolios of interest for each of the four quarters. We find the next
one-year underperformance of low book-to-market stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and contemporaneously sold by
hedge funds in quarter q is not confined to a specific quarter. The
weakest negative alphas are in q + 2, where the monthly threeand four-factor alphas are -1.05% (t-stat=-2.02) and -0.79% (tstat=-1.95), respectively, while the strongest alphas are in q+4
where three- and four-factor alphas are -1.30% (t-stat = -3.21)
and -1.23% (t-stat=-3.39), respectively.33 Thus, the results from
Table 7 show that hedge fund’s detection of over-priced stocks in
quarter q and those stocks’ significant underperformance in the

Table 7
Future quarterly returns of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds in quarter q
Stocks are first independently sorted into quintiles based on the book-to-market ratios and the most
recent quarter (quarter q) of non-hedge funds’ trades. Then, within the top 20% (heavy buy) of nonhedge funds’ trades of growth (low book-to-market) stocks in quarter q, two sub-portfolios are created
based on whether hedge funds buy or sell. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of June of each calendar
year. The table reports for each of the next four calendar quarters (from July of year t to the end of June
t + 1) the monthly CAPM alphas, Fama-French (1993) three-factor alphas, Carhart (1997' four-factor
alphas and DGTW (1997) characteristic-adjusted returns of the two aforementioned sub-portfolios in
question. The sample period is July 1982 to June 2014. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The numbers in bold denote significance at the 5% level or
better.

NONHF heavy buy

Qtr

q + I (July, August, September)

q + 2 (October, November, December)

q + 3 (January, February, March)

q + 4 (April, May, June)

CAPM alpha
t-stat
3-factor alpha
t-stat
4-factor alpha
t-stat
Char. Adj. Ret.
t-stat
CAPM alpha
t-stat
3-factor alpha
t-stat
4-factor alpha
t-stat
Char. Adj. Ret.
t-stat
CAPM alpha
t-stat
3-factor alpha
t-stat
4-factor alpha
t-stat
Char. Adj. Ret.
t-stat
CAPM alpha
t-stat
3-factor alpha
t-stat
4-factor alpha
t-stat
Char. Adj. Ret.
t-stat

subsequent year is not due to a large underperformance in a spe
cific quarter. That is, the underperformance persists in all four
quarters, suggesting that hedge fund demand (within the universe
of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds) is a robust
indicator of future quarterly returns as well.
The quarterly return analysis reported in Table 7 also reveals
an interesting trading strategy based on the disagreement between
hedge funds and other institutions with respect to the book-tomarket effect. Specifically, we suggest an enhanced book-to-market
return spread by taking short positions in growth stocks sold by
hedge funds and heavily bought by other institutions, and by taking long positions in value stocks sold heavily by other institutions and bought by hedge funds. Such a strategy, skipping the
first three months after the end of June of year t (i.e., the standard
portfolio formation calendar month in the relevant literature), can
be formed at the end of September of year t after observing the
quarter q trades of institutions during the q + 1 period. This zerocost investment portfolio strategy held over a nine-month period
yields an average monthly three-factor alpha of 1.39% (1.18% (short
side)+ 0.22% (long side)).34

HF sell(< 0)

HF buy(>0)

-1.71%
(-3.90)
-1.35%
(-3.66)
-1.09%
(-2.84)
-0.95%
(-2.87)
-1.33%
(-2.26)
-1.05%
(-2.02)
-0.79%
(-1.95)
-0.42%
(-1.99)
-0.84%
(-1.64)
-1.12%
(-2.81)
-0.96%
(-2.57)
-0.63

-0.02%
(-0.04)
0.54%
(1.87)
0.68%
(2.20)
0.45%
(1.43)
-0.52%
(-1.06)
-0.22%
(-0.70)
-0.08%
(-0.26)
0.33
(1.10)
-0.76%
(-1.84)
-0.83%
(-2.69)
-0.75%
(-2.33)
-0.29
(-1.08)
-0.35%
(-0.81)
-0.31%
(-1.09)
-0.28%
(-1.03)
0.06%
(0.20)

(-1.97)
-1.25%
(-2.61)
-1.30%
(-3.21)
-1.23%
(-3.39)
-0.88%
(-2.37)

6.2. Sub-period analysis
The Lipper TASS starts including defunct funds in the database
starting from 1994. Therefore, we may be missing from our analyses some hedge funds that have shut down before 1994. The existence of survivorship bias in the TASS database prior to 1994
may have an effect on our full sample results. In addition, bookto-market’s recognition as an anomaly starting with Fama and
French (1992), might have reduced the magnitude of the anomaly
in following years, moderating the size of the abnormal returns
that can be generated on those growth stocks heavily bought by
non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds. In order
to address these potential concerns, we examine whether the full
sample results vary over time. To this end, we divide our full sample period July 1982 to June 2014 covering 384 months into two
sample periods; July 1982 to June 1995, and July 1995 to June 2014.
We report the average monthly CAPM, three-factor, four-factor alphas, and DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns of portfolios of
interest along with their t-statistics in these two sub-periods in
Table 8.

Table 8
Sub-period analysis of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds
Stocks are first independently sorted into quintiles based on the book-to-market ratios and the most recent quarter (quarter q) of non-hedge funds’ trades. Then, within the top 20% (heavy buy) of non-hedge
funds' trades of growth (low book-to-market) stocks, two sub-portfolios are created based on whether
hedge funds buy or sell. The portfolio return measurement window is from July of year t to June of
year t + 1. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of June of each calendar year. For each sub-sample period, the table reports for the next one year (from July of year t to the end of June t + 1) the monthly
CAPM alphas, Fama-French (1993) three-factor alphas, Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas and DGTW (1997)
characteristic-adjusted returns of the two aforementioned sub-portfolios in question. The two subsample
periods are July 1982 to June 1995, and July 1995 to June 2014. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The numbers in bold denote significance at the 1% level.
July 1995 to June 2014

July 1982 to June 1995

CAPM alpha
t-stat
3-factor alpha
t-stat
4-factor alpha
t-stat
Char. Adj. Ret
t-stat

HF sell(< 0)

HF buy(>0)

Buy-Sell

HF sell(< 0)

HF buy(>0)

Buy-Sell

-1.42%
(-3.78)
-0.98%
(-3.77)
-1.02%
(-3.86)
-0.58%
(-2.45)

—0.63%
(-1.93)
-0.13%
(-0.47)
-0.18%
(-0.63)
0.19%
(0.77)

0.79%
(2.51)
0.85%
(2.62)
0.84%
(2.35)
0.77%
(2.49)

-1.18%
(-3.32)
-1.23%
(-3.98)
-1.02%
(-4.13)
-0.81%
(-3.15)

-0.26%
(-0.88)
-0.21%
(-1.03)
-0.08%
(-0.37)
0.10
(0.53)

0.92%
(2.82)
1.02%
(2.81)
0.94%
(2.90)
0.91
(3.21)

The results presented in Table 8 confirm the existence and continuation of a significant underperformance of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and contemporaneously sold by
hedge funds in the more recent survivorship bias free period (July
1995 to June 2014) as well. The low book-to-market stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and sold by hedge funds yield a
monthly three-factor alpha of -0.98% (t-stat = — 3.77) for the earlier sub-sample period and a monthly three-factor alpha of -1.23%
(t-stat = -3.98) for the more recent sub-sample period. The results
are similar for the four-factor alphas and DGTW characteristicadjusted returns as well.
In sum, our main results from the full sample period hold for
both of the sub-periods, suggesting that our findings are robust
and are not driven by the survivorship bias that exists in the hedge
fund database prior to 1994.35

6.3. The effect of small number of stocks on portfolio returns
In our analyses most of the return predictability tests are conducted on the subset of growth stocks that are heavily bought by
non-hedge funds. Among these stocks, the significant results are
generated from a subset of stocks that are sold by hedge funds
(24 stocks on average as reported in Table 3). The small number
of stocks in the portfolio of interest may raise concerns about the
generalizability of our findings. To that end, we examine the timeseries variation in portfolio size (i.e., the number of stocks in the
portfolio) for portfolios of growth stocks heavily bought by nonhedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds. In Fig. 3, we
illustrate a histogram of the number of stocks in the portfolio of
interest covering the full sample period of 384 months. While the
average numbers of stocks in our portfolio of interest is 24, the
minimum number of stocks goes down below 10 to only 9 only
once. More importantly, in 300 out of the 384 months (i.e., 78%
of the time), the portfolio of interest has more than 15 stocks at
a given point in time. We next check the effect of small number of stocks (in the portfolio of interest) on our main findings.
We find that when the months with portfolios with less than 20
stocks are excluded from the analysis, the monthly CAPM, threefactor, four-factor alphas, and DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns
of the growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and sold

by hedge funds turn out to be -0.98% (t-stat =-3.27), -0.98% (tstat=-3.83), -0.90% (t-stat =-3.64), and -0.66% (t-stat =-3.02),
respectively. This shows that the extreme small number of stocks
does not have any significant impact on our main findings.
In order to further address the issue and ease concerns about
the effect of small number of stocks on our main findings, we repeat our trivariate portfolio analysis by expanding the number of
stocks in our portfolio of interest. To this end, each year we sort
the stocks based on the previous fiscal year-end book-to-market
ratios and identify the top 30 percentile (value) and the bottom
30 percentile (growth) stocks. We also sort stocks independently
based on their quarter q non-hedge fund demand and identify the
top 30 percentile (heavy buy) and bottom 30 percentile (heavy
sell) stocks. Then, within the top 30% (heavy buy) and bottom
30% (heavy sell) of non-hedge funds’ demand for value and growth
stocks, we further create two portfolios contemporaneously based
on whether hedge funds’ demand is positive (buy) or negative
(sell). Generating trivariate portfolios in this format by focusing on
the top and bottom 30% (as opposed to 20%) of book-to-market
ratios and non-hedge fund demand increases the average number of stocks in the portfolio of interest to 63 from 24. We next
compute the average monthly CAPM, three-factor, four-factor alphas, and DGTW characteristic adjusted returns of these alternative
portfolios (with larger number of stocks) over the one-year return
measurement window.
Similar to our results reported in Panel A of Table 3, growth
stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and contemporaneously
sold by hedge funds significantly underperform in the following
year those growth stocks heavily purchased by non-hedge funds
and simultaneously bought by hedge funds. The CAPM, threefactor, four-factor alphas, and DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns of this underperformance are 0.31% (t-stat = 2.41), 0.42% (tstat = 3.18), 0.34% (t-stat = 2.85), and 0.43% (t-stat = 2.89), respectively. More importantly, this underperformance is mainly due to
the poor performance of those stocks sold by hedge funds. The
CAPM, three-factor, four-factor alphas, and DGTW characteristicadjusted returns of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge
funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds are -0.62% (tstat=-3.25), -0.56% (t-stat =-4.09), -0.41% (t-stat =-3.20), and
-0.38% (t-stat =-3.01), respectively, when the average number of
stocks in the portfolio is 63, much higher than the original 24

Fig. 3. Histogram of the number of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds in quarter q
At the end of June of year t, stocks are first independently sorted into quintiles based on the book-to-market ratios and the most recent quarter (quarter q) of non-hedge
funds' trades. Then, within the top 20% (heavy buy) of non-hedge funds’ trades of growth (low book-to-market) stocks, two sub-portfolios are created based on whether
hedge funds buy or sell. This figure reports the number of times (months) how many stocks appeared in the portfolio of interest. The portfolio of interest is the portfolio of
growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds in quarter q.

stocks in the portfolio.36 Therefore, our inferences regarding the
superior ability of hedge funds in detecting overpriced growth
stocks remain the same even when we expand the number of
stocks in our portfolio of interest.
Finally, one last related possible concern might be the effect of
extreme outliers on the large negative alphas when the number
of stocks in the portfolio of interest is low. As an additional robustness check, each month we exclude from our original trivariate
portfolios the stocks with the minimum and maximum monthly
returns. When these two stocks are excluded from our analyses, the monthly CAPM, three-factor, four-factor alphas, and DGTW
characteristic-adjusted returns of the growth stocks heavily bought
by non-hedge funds and sold by hedge funds become -1.46%,
-1.38%, -1.21%, and -0.93%, respectively, and still statistically significant at the 1% level, again showing no significant change from
the full sample results. All in all, we can conclude that the small
number of stocks in our portfolio of interest does not seem to have
any significant impact on our main findings.
7. Conclusion

Recent studies find that institutional investors’ actions as a
whole group exacerbate the price overreaction, contributing to the
book-to-market effect (see, e.g., Jiang, 2010 and Edelen et al., 2016).
We examine whether a prominent sub-group of institutional investors, i.e., hedge funds, act in the same manner as most other institutions, and fail to take advantage of the arbitrage opportunities

generated by the value premium. We find that hedge funds change
their preference from growth stocks to value stocks in the quarter
immediately after the book-to-market values of all stocks become
public information. However, the finding that hedge funds change
their trading preferences with respect to growth and value stocks
does not necessarily mean that they have superior ability to detect
mispriced securities among growth and value stocks compared to
other institutional investors. For a more direct test, we focus on the
disagreement between hedge funds’ and non-hedge funds’ trading
with respect to book-to-market effect, and examine whether such
disagreement predicts the future stock returns. We find evidence
suggesting that hedge funds can detect overpriced growth securities when there is a major difference in opinions with non-hedge
funds, who aggressively move in the opposite direction.
We believe our findings that hedge funds alter their trading
in favor of value stocks in the quarter immediately after book-tomarket values become public information as well as the fact that
hedge funds have the ability to detect overpriced growth securities
complement the literature and open the venue for future research
on the role of disagreements between market participants to better
understand other stock return anomalies.
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